Editors note: This is the fifth article in a five-part series featuring interviews with former members of the U.N. Panel of Experts. (Part 1 is here | Part 2 is here) | (Part 3 is here) | (Part 4 is here) | (Part 5 is here)

While North Korea watchers are likely all familiar with the U.N.’s Panel of Experts (PoE) on the DPRK, it is not the only panel out there.

Over time, other panels emerged when international consensus was sufficient enough to support the creation of expert groups at the U.N. to investigate other hot geopolitical topics.

These have included an expert group which focused on Iran – that wrapped up in 2015 – as well as PoEs focusing on countries including Somalia, Libya, Central African Republic and Yemen. There have even been PoEs established to investigate non-state actors, too, like Al Qaeda.

So, how does the North Korea-focused PoE compare to other topics of global interest? To find out answers, NK Pro spoke to five former members of the Panel to gather their thoughts and analysis.

Experts for the interview series include*:

• John Everard – Former Coordinator of the U.N.’s DPRK Panel of Experts – UK
• Katsu Furukawa – Former expert of the U.N.’s DPRK Panel of Experts – Japan
• Martin Uden –Former Coordinator of the U.N.’s DPRK Panel of Experts – UK
• Neil Watts – Former expert of the U.N.’s DPRK Panel of Experts – South Africa
• Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt – Former expert of the U.N.’s DPRK Panel of Experts – United States

* Chinese and Russian former members of the Panel declined to take part in all interviews.

NK PRO: How do you think the U.N.’s Panel of Experts (PoE) on the DPRK compares to PoEs researching issues like Somalia, Iran, Sudan, Libya, CAR, Yemen?

These responses have been lightly edited and condensed for clarity and readability.

Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt: One clear difference is that [those working on the] DPRK panel have a larger problem traveling to the country that they’re supposed to be investigating. The only travel and investigation that can happen is in third countries and clearly, the countries most implicated in violations aren’t going to feel particularly incentivized to invite the Panel to visit.

Each panel also has different methods of work, which are developed according to the needs of the particular sanctions regime and the nature of investigations of violations. Several of the panels for African countries coordinate with any U.N. field presences including peacekeeping operations and agencies on the ground for their visits and investigations.

We had certain methods of work in the DPRK panel that differed from the Iran panel (before its dissolution). For example, DPRK panel members were able to send out letters requesting information on alleged violations to member states, which are signed by the panel’s coordinator, but didn’t require approval by all other members of the panel.

This differed from the practice of the Iran panel where every member of the panel had to agree for all letters going out, which greatly restricted their investigations. However, this longstanding work method in the DPRK panel has since come under increasing pressure in the form of attempts to restrict the number and type of requests for information that can go out.

One clear difference is that [those working on the] DPRK panel have a larger problem traveling to the country that they’re supposed to be investigating.

There’s also a difference between home-based panels and New York-based panels.

The New York-based panels are treated differently and have access to resources and staff in the U.N. secretariat and can easily meet with diplomats representing their countries at Security Council and its Committees. The New York-based panels have been considered more political than the others.

The Iran and DPRK panels have traditionally had the most interest and involvement from members of the Security Council, making them vulnerable to the politics of the day: that was just impossible to escape.

Neil Watts: The DPRK sanctions regime is more comprehensive than probably all the other sanctions regimes put together. There is also a much higher emphasis on investigation than in the other panels.

But, of course, the biggest challenge is that the Panel can’t ever go to North Korea, for various reasons. While it has that challenge, being based in New York has other advantages in terms of being close to all the Missions and being able to have meetings at relatively short notice. Plus, the Panel sits together as opposed to home-based panels.

When it comes to budget, it’s a bit more difficult in terms of getting allocated funding for certain functions. Although the resolution does say that the Panel should get all the cooperation, it does have budgetary restrictions, especially when it comes to things such as purchasing satellite imagery and getting subscriptions to certain databases. Although during my time, there was quite a great deal of access to subscription facilities on databases.

Despite being in New York City, North Korea never responded to our inquiries, however. Whenever we sent them inquiries, we sent them via FedEx or a recognized company that will have a record of delivery to the DPRK Mission. But they never acknowledged any correspondence with the Panel.

The DPRK sanctions regime is more comprehensive than probably all the other sanctions regimes put together.

Obviously, the Panel afforded them the same rights or opportunity of replying to investigations and to statements made in the reports, but during my time, there was never a response and I strongly suspect that after my time, there hasn’t been any improvement in that regard. Of course, North Korea doesn’t recognize the Committee, the Panel or the right of the Security Council to sanction them anyway.

Katsu Furukawa: The DPRK panel has a relatively stronger impact than the other panels, in my personal view. This is particularly the case over the past few years, because the U.S. government finally found utility in the Panel’s report and recommendations. The U.S. government tried to push hard to strengthen sanctions based upon the U.N. Panel’s findings on record reporting.

So, how much impact each panel may have on the sanctions regime actually depends upon the political will of the U.N. Security Council member states.

But having said that, the DPRK panel is not alone. Other panels have also been making a number of recommendations. Other panels’ reporting also has an impact, so it’s really difficult to quantify or qualitatively state how much more impact the DPRK panel may have.

The DPRK panel has a relatively stronger impact than the other panels, in my personal view.

But, in general, because DPRK has attracted global attention, and also, the U.S. government (at least until 2018) placed North Korea as one of the priority issues in their national security policy strategy, the Panel was able to have quite a considerable impact.

John Everard: The Panels of Experts are very varied.

Relatively speaking, the Panel of Experts on the DPRK is well-run and quite well disciplined. There have been problems with some of the older established Panels of Experts with quality of reports, and with strange misbehavior by some of the members.

But I do think that the Panel of Experts on the DPRK hasn’t suffered that. It is quite a good outfit.

I don’t know about the Iran panel. Has it had more impact? That’s difficult to answer because some of the other Panels of Experts have scored surprising hits – they’ve caught wrongdoers almost in flagrante and have had quite an impact on the problems that they were set up to solve.

Over time, the DPRK panel of Experts has certainly been effective. Where it stands in the general ranking would require a bit of research to answer.

Martin Uden: Of course, my perspective is very much back from when I was running the Panel in 2012-2014. Some of the panels you mentioned there have come into existence since, and so I can’t really compare in any sort of detail. What I found at the time, though, compared to the others going on was a very mixed bag.

Some other panels were, frankly, better resourced, particularly the one on Al-Qaeda and terrorism, they were very well-resourced. The 1541 Committee was also very well-resourced. But the DPRK panel, although it lacked more resources, had, I think, a very good working method.

We got on pretty well inside the Panel and I think we were pretty efficient in the way we worked. Other panels had stupid rules, they were more badly financed, couldn’t travel as much.

Other panels had stupid rules, they were more badly financed, couldn’t travel as much.

I think we did a reasonable job during that time, particularly, of course, with the big case found in Panama. We did a reasonable job keeping our head above water, but it was not easy.

Edited by Kelly Kasulis