Analysis The View from Jingshan: Beijing’s silence reflects confidence in North KoreaChina's goal of a "normal state relationship" with the DPRK seems closer than ever After several turbulent years of bilateral Sino-DPRK relations, Beijing finally appears content with the direction of its relationship with North Korea. Mainland Chinese coverage of North Korea affairs is increasingly limited to diplomatic engagements ranging from commemoration of CCP milestones to sports exchanges: amid a trade war with the U.S., development projects worldwide, growing economic concerns, and a tainted vaccine scandal, there is a drought of commentary on North Korea. China has many reasons to remain silent on North Korea, and this silence reflects confidence, at least in the short term, about its interests on the peninsula. Mutual interests In recent years, Chinese observers have countered the traditional rationale for the Sino-DPRK alliance. Due to advances in military technology, changes in the Sino-ROK relationship, and the prospect of nuclear disaster on the Sino-DPRK border, North Korea’s value as a buffer has diminished. At times, North Korea has appeared more of a liability than an asset to China. However, new strategic interests bind both sides. China needs North Korea’s cooperation if it is to become the political and economic leader of Northeast Asia. China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative aims to build new connections between South Korea and Eurasia which run through China. To that end, North Korea’s participation in OBOR is crucial. The infamous New Yalu River Bridge is perhaps the highest-profile Chinese investment in North Korea which has failed to live up to its potential. North Korea is seen as key to the rejuvenation of Northeast China’s economy, both in the context of OBOR and bilateral trade. Reports suggest that China is making new efforts to operationalize the bridge in its interactions with North Korea. (“Deputy director of KWP international department visits China,” Multidimensional News, July 24) In addition, as China seeks to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Seoul, any successful efforts to influence North Korea will yield political capital for Beijing. Many American observers believe that the road to Pyongyang runs through Seoul; China is attempting to determine to what degree the opposite is true by presenting an alternative to the volatility of Washington’s North Korea policy. Economic relationship remains crucial The past six months have shown that North Korea remains heavily reliant on China, and this will not change in the near future. China’s support for and enforcement of U.N. sanctions against North Korea got Pyongyang’s attention. The Sino-DPRK economic relationship remains crucial to North Korea, and it needs to continue trading with China. In addition, North Korea continues to rely on China to advocate for the loosening of sanctions and to promote investment in North Korea. Recent reports suggest that China is doing both: China attempted to lighten sanctions against North Korea at the U.N. on June 29. (“Will China use North Korea as a card in trade war against the U.S.?” Multidimensional News, July 12) Numerous Chinese research and editorial pieces have touted the benefits of multilateral investment in North Korea as well as integration of North Korea into the Northeast Asian economy. Man Yan, a Northeast Asia researcher at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, also advocated for economic engagement which did not violate existing sanctions, including through OBOR. (“South Korea’s ‘new northern policy’ against the backdrop of OBOR,” Man Yan, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, July 12) Sticking to the script Since the unprecedented three visits by a North Korean leader to China within less than three months, engagements between Chinese and North Korean officials have centered around the same three points (at least according to the reporting of Chinese government entities). Over the past few months, Chinese officials at various levels have met with North Korean counterparts to discuss everything from economic development to opportunities for the Chinese pharmaceutical industry in North Korea, to inter-party exchanges. (“Dalian mayor Tan Cheng Xu meets with North Korean National Environmental Protection representative,” Dalian News Net, July 21) Both sides have reportedly been keen to acknowledge a mutual “friendship,” “cultivated by the older generations,” and heed the call to “implement the important consensus” reached by Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un during the latter’s three visits to China this year. (“Chinese consul general to Chongjin visits Rason special economic zone,” PRC Foreign Ministry, August 2) By Beijing’s accounts, North Korean officials have praised China’s “construction of socialism” and its path of reform and opening, as well as the importance of their leader’s three visits to China. (“Chinese embassy in North Korea holds event commemorating 91st anniversary of PLA founding,” People’s Daily, August 1) Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity, government statements about official Chinese visits to North Korea avoid substance. Instead, “dialogue,” “communication,” “collaboration” and “exchange” are emphasized. China is talking about doing many things with North Korea, but its actions related to diplomatic and economic outreach are unclear. Toward a “normal state relationship” In April, following Kim’s first visit to China, Jiang Wang Chao, a contributor to the Epoch Times, hypothesized that Xi had long hoped to convert the Sino-DPRK relationship to a “normal state relationship.” This involves normal diplomatic norms rather than shared communist ideology. (“Why Xi shook Kim’s hand rather than embraced him,” Jiang Wang Chao, Epoch Times, April 12) Jiang cited this objective as the reason for the handshake between Xi and Kim at their first meeting, which contrasted with the embraces of Kim Jong Il given by previous Chinese leaders. Despite an overwhelmingly positive past six months, the Sino-DPRK relationship is not quite as close as it was at its strongest points of the preceding decades. However, this is not the reason for Xi’s desire to update the norms shaping the bilateral relationship. China’s Cold War relationship with North Korea was defined by shared antagonism toward South Korea, Japan and other American allies in East Asia. As such, members of the communist leadership of both sides cultivated strong, intergenerational personal relationships. Some observers suggest that such relationships continue to influence China’s North Korea policy through party officials loyal to former leader Jiang Zemin. After the Cold War ended, China found its regional policy constrained. When it opened diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, the North Korean leadership was reportedly enraged. Reports suggest that Kim Jong Un has also seethed at this so-called “betrayal.” Now that China seeks to lead in East Asia, it has cultivated a close relationship with South Korea; similarly, Sino-Japanese relations are also on the mend. China can no longer afford to be beholden to North Korea. In addition, while China values its partnership with North Korea for reasons of maintaining stability along its border, exercising regional leadership and keeping leverage over the U.S., it hopes to exert more influence over North Korea through normal diplomatic institutions. As a result, China is highlighting run-of-the-mill diplomatic and economic engagements with North Korea to bring a much-desired degree of normality to the bilateral relationship. It is hoping North Korea will see the benefit of opening to the world (preferably to China first) and forsaking its reckless saberrattling. In addition, Chinese media are increasingly reporting on positive aspects of daily life in North Korea, such as the Mandarin curriculum at Pyongyang Foreign Languages University and Mandarin adult education classes at the Grand People’s Study Hall. (“Pyongyang Foreign Languages University students study Chinese, Silk Road as country internationalizes,” Xinhua, July 14; “Chinese journalists visit Grand People’s Study Hall,” Xinhua, July 18) In addition, by framing such engagement in scripted and unimpeachable terms, China can control the narrative of its engagement with North Korea and avoid the appearance of relenting on its economic sanctions. Trouble beneath the surface Despite official statements praising Sino-DPRK cooperation and a dearth of negative commentary, many Chinese observers remain highly distrustful of North Korea. Rather than praise North Korea’s efforts after satellite images were released on July 23 which appeared to show dismantling of facilities at the Sohae Satellie Launching Station, Chinese social media users reacted with harsh skepticism. One noted, “the old house has been torn down, and afterwards a new house is built,” suggesting that North Korea will simply construct another launch site. Another noted that “[North Korea] previously dismantled its rockets, but the whole world was deceived and became surprised to see it launch rockets from other places; now that [this site] has been demolished, I fear a new one is ready.” Another was quite frank: “I am not optimistic about the Korean Peninsula peace process, North Korea cannot give up its nuclear program.” (“Netizens react to apparent dismantling of missile construction site in North Korea,” Sina Weibo, July 25) Such negative reactions to an apparently positive development suggest that if North Korea restarts nuclear or missile tests, many Chinese will be outraged. In that event, Beijing’s present encouragement of North Korea could become a liability. Conclusions The relative stability of the Korean peninsula is in China’s interest, and it hopes that productive engagement of North Korea can continue without incident. Its larger objective of the leadership on the North Korean nuclear issue has not changed. The scripted messaging used by both China and North Korea serves many purposes. After tensions between both erupted into public view last year, the use of simple and unassailable language serves as protective armor for their relationship but could also conceal behavior such as violations of sanctions. While Xi appears keen to “open a new chapter” of Sino-DPRK relations and move away from the chummy interactions his predecessors shared with the Kims to a more normal and functional relationship, he probably has some nostalgia for the bilateral relationship of old. Xi ascended to leadership less than a year after Kim Jong Il’s death, and reports suggest that he and Jong Un got off on the wrong foot. Rumors of a Beijing-backed plan to depose Kim in favor of his half-brother, which surfaced in 2012, and Kim’s 2013 execution of Jang Song Taek, who was reportedly complicit in the plot and too close to China, soured the relationship between both leaders long before Kim restarted nuclear tests in 2016. In addition to North Korea’s desire for trade and loosening of sanctions, China offers something less tangible which is conveyed in its official writings about North Korea: respect. Numerous examples of Chinese individuals poking fun at North Korea and its leader (such as “fatty Kim the third,” the moniker used by many netizens for Kim, and a video made in 2014 to the tune of a popular Chinese song featuring unflattering photoshopped images of Kim) have added to the torrent of insults directed at North Korea from around the world. What China hopes to offer North Korea is confidence in China’s stewardship to transform its economy and relationship with the world. (“Establish North Korean model for confident economic development,” Zhong Hong Net, August 2) In the process, Beijing has scrupulously used the official titles of North Korean leaders, avoided characterizing North Korea as “backward” and used language which bestows equality on North Korea. (Among other actions, China has also heavily censored insults of Kim Jong Un from search engines and social media platforms.) The most common observation of Chinese tourists visiting North Korea is that the country appears as China did 40 years ago. By promoting “reform and opening” of North Korea, Beijing is turning a perception of North Korea as backward into a point of sympathy: China has been there before, and Beijing believes it can offer North Korea a way out. Edited by Oliver Hotham Featured image: Kremlin.ru © Korea Risk Group. All rights reserved. |