Extended Deterrence in N.E Asia achieving mixed results

Tad Farrell August 31 2010 WASHINGTON DC.

A panel of experts agreed Monday that the U.S policy of extended nuclear deterrence is doing little to stimulate North Korean denuclearization, but has helped in keeping some regional countries from going nuclear them selves.

The specialists were talking at an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia” in Washington DC yesterday.

Leading the discussion, Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in N.E. Asia: to protect and reassure them against danger; to project U.S power and become part of the region’s security management structure; to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear; and to build “better communities,” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region, such as China and Japan.

In trying to understanding North Korea’s nuclear motivations, Morgan said that ever increasing differences between North-South economic, military and political indicators caused Pyongyang a “terrible deterrence” problem that it “has worked very hard to try and overcome” – by building its own nuclear weapons.
In the current context, Morgan explained that many of Washington’s policy goals could not now be realized through the provision of extended deterrence in the region. He highlighted how little the ‘nuclear umbrella’ has helped in reversing North Korea’s nuclear program, curbing its proliferation related activities, or in limiting its capacity to conduct nuclear blackmail. While he admitted that North Korea would unlikely ever use its nuclear weapons directly against allies, he explained that this was likely because of other factors. However, he did concede that Washington’s extended deterrence has been useful in keeping allies from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

Morgan said the main reason Washington’s current North Korea approach would not achieve results was because it was “out of sync” with China. He explained, “doing it the way we’re doing it now is putting more and more pressure on North Korea in the [same] way we’re trying to put a lot of pressure on the Taliban in Afghanistan – and they’ve got a fallback…[in this case] Chinese supplies, aid, and investments.”

He expanded, “in effect, we have tried hard to budge North Korea and we have had no success. China has tried to budge North Korea with an alternative approach, also without success. If we don’t get success because of their efforts, we have serious costs in terms of what we want. But if they don’t get a success in terms of our efforts, they [in contrast] are not paying a huge price.”

To achieve positive outcomes in the current context, Morgan firstly advised the U.S to try and find adjustments in the regional security management arrangement to compensate for “detaching extended nuclear deterrence from the problem.” He suggested one such adjustment could be a strengthening of conventional forces in the area. Secondly, he noted that in terms of deterrence theory, one way to influence China to better coordinate with Washington could be to indirectly threaten Beijing, perhaps one day through a gradual promotion of nuclear programs in Japan or South Korea – programs that Beijing would unlikely desire.

Dr. Victor Cha, CSIS Korea Chair, agreed with Morgan that extended deterrence has so far not been overly successful in the North East Asian context. While underscoring the utility of it in helping deter a second Korean war or attack on Japan, Cha pointed to Washington’s inability to limit Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests and its conventional belligerency as evidence of some of its failures. Despite this, he stopped short of recommending an end to the umbrella, for while North Korea could view it as a major act of conciliation, he noted the act could also be perceived as an admission of defeat – perhaps giving Pyongyang a misconceived confidence that they exercise “nuclear superiority” on the Korean peninsula.”

Instead, Cha said he believed extended deterrence was increasingly becoming symbolic in the North East Asian context, most often used by senior U.S representatives to assure allies post-crises situations. He cited U.S visits to the ROK and Japan after the first two nuclear tests as evidence of this.

However, Cha observed “any time you take an action of reassurance, the allies perceive it as being situationally motivated… it registers as a positive statement, but only because of the situation. On the other hand when the United States makes statements that might sound like it is less reassuring…the allies immediately register this dispositional attribute. In other words, when the U.S says they will not attack North Korea with nuclear weapons [as in September 2005], that is not situational, that truly reflects American disposition. This is a constant battle in the nature of the reassurance game.”

To deal with the current impasse Robert Carlin, Co-Chair of the National Committee on North Korea, said, “What can we accomplish in utilizing this extended deterrence directly with North Korea? Well we can’t accomplish anything with it I don’t think if we don’t eventually engage in some sort of conversation. There’s a lot of things we have to know about their concept of the utility of their nuclear weapons, apart from the public statements. Unless we sit down and talk to them about it at length, in depth, we are not going to be able to figure out the danger points, the points at which they may have misconceptions, and the points they are willing not to press on the nuclear issue – not to use it for compellence.”

Victor Cha later agreed with Carlin’s point of view, but outlined the policy dilemma currently facing policy makers in the U.S. While admitting it would be useful to debate nuclear deterrence with North Korea, as was done with the Soviets during the Cold War, he pointed out, “the minute you start to do that, even if you don’t explicitly or tacitly accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the minute you engage in that dialogue, everybody’s going to say you are accepting a nuclear North Korea, and that will have all sorts of ripple effects throughout the region, particularly among allies, who will then question the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence.”

After reaffirming the U.S commitment of extended nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia, State Department representative Jofi Joseph pointed out, “I would only note that the challenge of talking to North Korea without having denuclearization at the center of the agenda is that its very, very difficult for any US administration to engage in such talks unless that issue is front and center. The reason why we frankly care about North Korea is because of what they have done in the nuclear field and without that, this wouldn’t be high on the agenda for any administration.”

Lamenting on the current impasse, Robert Carlin commented, “I wouldn’t think that bad policy would be sustainable for a long time, except that it has been since 2002. Its lasted a long time and I’m afraid it can last longer. Not because there aren’t smart people in the right places, but because the politics of the situation, not just in this country, but in our allies just don’t favor the right decisions and the sense of leadership coming to the fore. Its not hopeless but perhaps it’s a good time to go fishing.”

The event was hosted by the Korea Chair and the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.